Does Corporate Governance Matter--A Crude Test Using Russian Data by Black, Bernard
DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTER
A CRUDE TEST USING RUSSIAN DATA
BERNARD BLACKt
Does a firm's corporate governance behavior affect its market value? In most
empirical tests in developed countries, firm-specific corporate governance actions
have little or no effect on market value. These weak results could reflect limited
variation amongfirms in governance practices.
In contrast, the corporate governance practices of Russian firms vary widely,
from quite good to awful. I test whether corporate governance behavior affects the
market value of Russian firms using (1)fall 1999 corporate governance rankings
developed iry a Russian investment bank for sixteen Russian public companies
and (2) the "value ratio" of actual market capitalization to potential 1estern
market capitalization for these firms, determined independently at the same time by
a second Russian investment bank. The correlation between ln(value ratio) and
governance ranking is striking and is statistically strong despite the small sample
size: Pearson r = 0.90 (p < .0001). A one-standard-deviation improvement in
governance ranking predicts an 8fold increase in firm value; a worst (51
ranking) to best (7 ranking) governance improvement predicts a 600-fold increase
in firm value. My results are tentative, due to the small sample size. But they
suggest that a firm's corporate governance behavior can have a huge effect on its
market value in a country where other constraints on corporate behavior are weak.
INTRODUCTION
Does a firm's corporate governance behavior-defined broadly to
include both the governance rules that the firm adopts and the
behavior of its insiders along governance-related dimensions-affect
its market value? For United States firms, evidence that governance
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practices matter is scarce. Most tests of whether interfirm variations in
corporate governance practices affect firms' market value or
performance come up empty. When effects are found, they are
economically small-often only a percent or two.
And yet, perhaps the problem is with the data, not the proposition
that firms' corporate governance behavior affects their market value.
The minimum quality of American corporate governance, set by law
and by norms so widely accepted that almost no public firms depart
from them, is quite high. The variation in firm behavior is small,
perhaps too small for us to observe large performance differences due
to this variation.
A stronger test of whether and by how much governance behavior
affects firms' market value could be possible in a country with weak
laws governing behavior by firms and their insiders (managers and
large shareholders), weak norms for insider conduct, and weak
reputational constraints on insider conduct. In such a country,
governance differences between firms will be larger and could have
measurable effects on market value.
Across all three dimensions, Russia offers a strong test case. Its
corporate and securities laws are unenforced and widely ignored.
Behavioral norms reinforce bad behavior-self-dealing and often
outright looting. And insiders didn't need to develop reputations for
honesty so that their firms could sell shares to the public. Instead,
major companies were sold in privatization auctions, letting even
disreputable insiders acquire control. The low minimum quality of
Russian corporate governance leaves huge room for interfirm
variation. Some insiders will simply loot their firms; others will try to
attract investors through good conduct; still others will steal some but
not all of the firm's profits.'
This Article tests the proposition that corporate governance
behavior affects the market value of Russian firms (the value that
outside, noncontrolling shareholders pay for the firm's shares). I use
fall 1999 corporate governance rankings for a sample of sixteen large
Russian public companies, developed by Brunswick Warburg, a major
Russian investment bank. These estimates were not directly, and their
creators believe that they were not indirectly, influenced by the firms'
market values.
I combine these governance rankings with data on the actual
See generally Bernard Black, Reinier Kraakman & Anna Tarassova, Russian
Privatization and Corporate Governance: What Went Wrong?, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1731 (2000).
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September 1999 market capitalization of these firms and estimates by
Troika Dialog, a second major Russian investment bank, of these
firms' potential Western market capitalization at that time. The
potential Western capitalization is based on the multiples of assets,
capacity, or revenue at which Western firms trade. I see no way for a
Russian firm's governance behavior to affect these estimates.
The "value ratio" of actual to potential Western market
capitalization offers a measure of the discounts that investors apply to
these firms. The variation in discounts is huge-the value ratios vary
from 0.48 for Vimpelcom to 0.0001 for Yuganskneftegaz.
The correlation between these firms' value ratios and their
corporate governance rankings offers a measure of how important
corporate governance behavior is, when investors value Russian firms.
The correlation is striking. The Pearson product-moment correlation
coefficient between In (value ratio) and governance ranking is r = 0.90,
with a t-statistic of 7.63 (significance level of p < .0001). These results
survive various robustness checks.
My results are tentative because of the small sample size. But they
suggest that the governance behavior of Russian firms greatly affects
their market value. A measure of how much: a one-standard-
deviation change in governance ranking predicts an 8-fold increase in
firm value. A worst (51 ranking) to best (7 ranking) change in
governance ranking predicts a 600-fold increase in firm value!
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I offers a brief overview of
research in the United States on the extent to which corporate
governance attributes correlate with firms' market value or
performance. Part II describes my research design. Part III presents
results. Part IV concludes and discusses policy implications and
possible extensions of this research.
I. DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE BEHAVIOR AFFECT FIRM VALUE?
A. Evidence from the United States
In the United States, efforts to find a correlation between a firm's
governance attributes and its market value mostly show weak or no
results. For example, the proportion of independent directors on a
company's board (or whether the company has a majority-
independent board) has no statistically significant effect on
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performance. Similarly, neither overt activism by institutional
investors, nor insider share ownership, nor ownership by outside
blockholders, nor a firm's committee structure, has a measurable
effect on performance!
When effects are found, they are usually small-a percentage
point or two difference in market value. Effects of this size are found,
for example, for a staggered board or other antitakeover provisions,'
incorporation in Delaware,5 or use of cumulative voting.'
B. Governance Behavior Should Matter More in Emerging Markets
The weak observed correlation between the corporate governance
practices of U.S. firms and their market value or performance could
2 See the reviews by Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship
Between Board Composition and Firm Performance; 54 Bus. LAW. 921 (1999), and MICHAEL
S. WEISBAcH & BENJAMIN E. HERMALIN, BOARDS OF DIRECTORS As AN ENDOGENOUSLY
DETERMINED INsTITUTION: A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMIC LrrERATURE (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W8161, 2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstractid=262721 (Social Science Research Network).
3 On institutional investor activism, see the surveys by Bernard Black, Shareholder
Activism and Corporate Governance in the United States, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 459 (Peter Newman ed., 1998), and
Jonathan Karpoff, The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Target Companies: A Survey of
Empirical Findings (1998), http://faculty.washington.edu/karpoff/papers.htm. On the
complex relationship between inside ownership and firm value, see, for example,
Harold Demsetz & Kenneth Lehn, The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and
Consequences, 93 J. POL. ECON. 1155 (1985), and Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer &
Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20
J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988). On outside blockholdings, see, for example, Sanjai Bhagat,
Bernard Black & Margaret Blair, Relational Investing and Firm Performance (1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). On board committees, see April Klein,
Firm Performance and Board Committee Structure, 41 J.L. & ECON. 275 (1998).
4 See, e.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Richard H.Jefferis, Voting Power in the Proxy Process: The
Case of Antitakeover Charter Amendments, 30J. FIN. ECON. 193 (1991); Robert Daines &
Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection in IPOs,
J.L. ECON. & ORG. (forthcoming 2001), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/
paper.taf?abstractlid=187348 (Social Science Research Network); Robert Daines, Do
Classified Boards Affect Firm Value? Takeover Defenses After the Poison Pill (2000)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with N.Y.U. Center for L. & Bus.) (finding a -1.5%
average price reaction to a Massachusetts law imposing staggered boards on all
Massachusetts firms).
See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, J. FIN. ECON.
(forthcoming 2001) (finding a +2% effect of incorporation in Delaware on firm value,
with outliers excluded), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafabstractid=
195109 (Social Science Research Network).
6 See Sanja Bhagat & James A. Brickley, Cumulative Voting: The Value of Minority
Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339 (1984) (finding a -1.5% average share
price reaction to a charter amendment that eliminates cumulative voting).
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mean that firms' corporate governance behavior has only a small
effect on their market value, compared to other elements such as
industry environment, macroeconomic factors, and management skill.
But the weak correlation could also reflect the restricted domain of
the data. Within a single country, with a well-developed corporate
governance system, differences among firms in corporate governance
practices may be limited.
In the United States, the minimum quality of corporate
governance, set by securities law, corporate law, stock exchange rules,
and behavioral norms so widely accepted that almost no public firms
depart from them, is quite high. The variation among firms could be
too small for performance differences to emerge from the large
amount of "noise" (other factors that affect firm performance) that
afflicts empirical studies in this area.
To conduct a stronger test, we ought to study a country with
weaker laws governing behavior by firms and insiders, weaker widely
accepted norms for insider conduct, and weaker reputational
constraints on insiders. Governance differences among firms will be
larger and the effects of interfirm variation on firms' market value or
performance will likely be larger as well.
Across all three dimensions, Russia offers as close to an ideal test
case as we are likely to find. It has decent corporate and securities
laws, but the laws are unenforced and widely ignored. Cultural norms
among managers and large shareholders reinforce bad rather than
good behavior. Self-dealing and often outright looting is the norm,
not the exception. And insiders didn't need to develop reputations
for honesty in order to sell shares to the public. Instead, major
companies were sold through privatization auctions, which let even
disreputable insiders acquire control in the privatization auctions or
thereafter. Indeed, control of many major companies was sold
directly to crooks, who got the money to buy them by skimming or
outright theft from the government.
7
Put these factors together and Russia ranked last in a recent
survey of corporate governance practices in twenty-five emerging
markets.' Russian investment banks routinely write reports with such
charming titles as Corporate Governance in Russia: Cleaning Up the Mess.9
See Black, Kraakman & Tarassoia, supra note 1, at 1742-46.
See Boris the Belligerent, ECONoMIST, Nov. 18, 2000, at 80; Craig Karmin, Corporate-
Governance Issues Hamper Emerging Markets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 8, 2000, at Cl."James Fenkner & Elena Krasnitskaya, Corporate Governance in Russia: Cleaning
Up the Mess (1999) (unpublished corporate report for Troika Dialog, on file with
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The low quality of Russian governance practices leaves huge room for
interfirm variation. Some insiders will loot their firms; others will try
to attract investors through good conduct; still others will behave
more or less typically by Russian standards (stealing some but not all
of a firm's profits).
The large variation in Russian corporate governance leads
investors to place heavy weight on a firm's governance behavior in
deciding which firm's shares to buy and how much to pay. The
qualitative evidence for investor concern includes:
(1) frequent reports on corporate governance issued by Russian
investment banks, including the rankings and other reports
discussed here, and the weekly Corporate Governance Bulletin
issued by the Troika Dialog investment bank, which discusses
current governance issues affecting particular Russian firms;
and
(2) the announcement by Standard & Poor's that it is developing
its own corporate governance rankings of Russian firms.'
This Article can be understood as an effort to see whether that
qualitative insight will translate into quantitative data that supports the
proposition that the corporate governance behavior of Russian firms
affects their market value.
II. RESEARCH DESIGN
My goal is to test whether interfirm variation in corporate
governance behavior has a significant effect on the market value of
Russian firms-and by inference, likely also the market value of firms
in other countries with weak corporate governance laws and norms. I
rely on two datasets, generated independently by two prominent
Russian investment banks.
A. Russian Corporate Governance Rankings
The first data set is fall 1999 corporate governance rankings of
sixteen major Russian firms, developed by the Brunswick Warburg
author).
10 See Press Release, Standard & Poor's, Standard & Poor's Launches Corporate
Governance Services in Russia (Nov. 14, 2000) (on file with author); see also Lyuba
Pronina, S&P Test lies Govenance Rating on Aeroflot, Moscow TIMEs, Mar. 21, 2001.
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investment bank." Brunswick Warburg rated Russian companies on a
0 to 60 scale, with higher numbers indicating higher governance risk.
The risk factors that influence the rankings and the maximum weight
given to each risk factor are listed in Table 1. The risk factors are
consistent with the view, which I have expressed elsewhere, that
corporate governance concerns in emerging markets focus on
information disclosure and control of self-dealing, not on the
developed country problem of persuading managers to maximize firm
value.1
The firm rankings are shown in Table 2. The highest ranking is 7
for Vimpelcom, which conducted an initial public offering in the
United States, is listed on the New York Stock Exchange, and
publishes financial statements using U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). The lowest rankings are 51 for
three subsidiaries of Yukos: Yuganskneftegaz, Samaraneftegaz, and
Tomskneft. During 1999, Yukos's controlling shareholder, Mikhail
Khodorkovski, was trying to transfer virtually all value from these
subsidiaries (and perhaps from Yukos itself) to shady offshore
companies.3 The Appendix provides a detailed breakdown of the risk
factors that enter each firm's overall ranking.
Potential bias in the regression results: None of the ranking elements
directly involves a firm's market value. Most elements rely primarily
on objective factors. For example, the dilution-through-share-issuance
risk factor uses as subfactors the existence of authorized but unissued
shares, the existence of preemptive rights, and minority investors
holding a blocking stake (a stake large enough to defeat a charter
amendment that would authorize additional shares). The Brunswick
Warburg report gives no hint that firms' market values entered the
rankings indirectly, through the choice or weighting of the corporate
governance risk factors. To further exclude the possibility that market
values indirectly influenced the rankings, I contacted Andrea
Rutherford, the report's principal author, who confirmed that: "We
did not use [market] valuations in any of our corporate governance
) S,,, Andrea C. Rutherford & Jeffrey R. Costello, Measuring Corporate
Governance Risk in Russia (Aug. 30, 1999) (unpublished corporate report for
Brunsuick Warburg, on file with author).
1 ' Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong
So',urti Markets, 48 UCLA L. REv. 781 (2001), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/paper.tafPabstract_id=182169 (Social Science Research Network); see
John C. Coffee, Jr., Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities
MrketFailur, 25J. CORP. L. 1, 17 (1999).
'' Se Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, supra note 1, at 1769-72.
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'scorings.' I have thought about each item and am sure that
valuations could not have 'crept' in indirectly either."
14
Table 1: Elements of Corporate Governance Risk
Risk Category
Disclosure and Transparency
No current U.S. GAAP or LAS financials
Poor reputation for openness
No ADR program
Poor shareholder meeting notice
Total
Dilution Through Share Issuance
Authorized but unissued shares
No portfolio investor blocking stake
No preemptive rights in charter
Total
Asset Stripping and Transfer Pricing
Controlling shareholder (private = 5, gov't = 3)
Works with trading companies
Total
Dilution Through Merger or Restructuring
Merger planned or possible
Restructuring planned or possible
Total
Bankruptcy Risk
Overdue accounts payable or tax arrears
High overall debt
Total
Limits on Foreign Ownership
Restricts foreign ownership or voting
Restricts foreign board membership
Total
Management Attitude Toward Shareholders
Poor corporate governance record
No outsider investor representatives on board
Total
Registrar Risk (Registrar Affiliated with Co.)
Total
Maximum Weight
6
4
2
2
14
5
3
2
10
5
5
10
5
5
10
3
2
5
3
2
5
3
2
5
1
60
B. Ratio of Actual to Potential Market Capitalization
The second data set consists of value ratios for these sixteen firms
14 Letter from Andrea Rutherford, Head of Sales, Brunswick Warburg, to Bernard
Black (Dec. 21, 2000) (on file with author).
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in September 1999 (matching the date of the corporate governance
rankings). The value ratio is computed as the ratio of (1) actual
market capitalization, based on trading prices in the Russian stock
market, to (2) potential Western market capitalization, if the firm
were "operated and valued in an efficient ... western market."'5
The Western market capitalization estimates were provided to me
by James Fenkner, Head of Equity Strategies at Troika Dialog, a major
Russian investment bank. Russian financial statements are often
opaque and many firms aren't run to maximize profit (at least
unskimmed profit). Troika Dialog therefore based the potential
Western market capitalization values on multiples of assets, capacity,
or (for telephone companies) sales, rather than multiples of cash flow
or profit. Table 2 shows these firms' actual September 1999 market
capitalization, their potential Western market capitalization, and the
Western-firm multiples used to compute each firm's potential Western
market capitalization. Table 2 also gives each firm's value ratio and
governance ranking.
An eyeball examination of Table 2 shows a strong correlation
between value ratio and governance ranking. Oil and gas companies
dominate the bottom of the value ratio rankings and also
predominate as the firms with the highest (worst) governance
rankings. There is huge potential value in Russian companies, but
outside shareholders expect to receive very little of that value. A
country with potential market capitalization of around $3 trillion
(including other companies not included in my sample) has an actual
market capitalization of under $30 billion.
' E-mail from James Fenkner, Head of Equity Strategies, Troika Dialog, to
Bernard Black (Mar. 7, 2001) (on file ith author).
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Table 2: Governance Rankings and Potential
Value for Selected Russian Companies
(at September 1999; in $ billions)
Governance rankings (from Brunswick Warburg) and potential Western
market capitalization estimates (from Troika Dialog) for selected major
Russian companies. Potential Western market capitalization is based on
Troika Dialog's estimates of Western multiples of assets, capacity, or revenue:
for oil and gas companies on $13 per barrel of oil reserves (or gas
equivalent); for electric companies on $795,000 per megawatt of generating
capacity; for Norilski Nickel on 0.085 x value of reserves at then current
commodity prices; for telephone companies on 4.3 x sales; for GAZ on $4,620
per vehicle produced; and for Sun Interbrew on $0.97 per liter of capacity.
Firms are listed in decreasing order of value ratio.
Market Value Ratio Govern-
Capitalization (Actual/Potential ance
Company Industry Actual Potential Market Cap) Ranking
Vimpelcom Telephone 0.58 1.2 0.48 7
Rostelecom Telephone 0.9 5 0.18 15
GAZ Truck Mfg. 0.11 0.7 0.16 17
Sun Interbrew Alcohol Mfg. 0.11 1.5 0.073 16
Mosenergo Electricity 0.8 12 0.067 15
Norilski Nickel Nickel 0.5 9 0.056 27
Surgutneftegaz Oil 4.4 91 0.048 26
Irkutskenergo Electricity 0.4 0 0.040 10
LukOil Oil 5.5 195 0.028 20
United Energy Electricity 3.1 110 0.028 24
Systems
Sibneft Oil 1.1 60 0.018 25
Tatneft Oil 0.4 75 0.005 18
Gazprom Natural Gas 4 1960 0.002 38
Tomskneft Oil 0.039 24 0.0016 51
Samaraneftegaz Oil 0.003 18 0.0002 51
Yuganskneftegaz Oil 0.014 110 0.0001 51
Total 22.0 2682 Mean = 0.07 Mean = 26
Potential bias in the regression results. The actual market
capitalization of these firms is based on actual trades. The potential
Western market capitalization is constructed by Troika Dialog based
on objective facts about the Russian firms-estimates of reserves,
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capacity, or revenue. Troika Dialog chose the multiples of reserves,
capacity, or revenue by looking at Western firms, not Russian firms.
Moreover, Troika Dialog did not know the sample firms' governance
rankings or the basis for the governance rankings. Indeed, Troika
Dialog initially created the potential Western market capitalization
values, at my request, for an entirely separate project-an earlier
article on what went wrong with Russian privatization."6 For all these
reasons, I don't see how the governance attributes of the sample firms
could affect Troika Dialog's estimate of their potential Western
market capitalization.
C. Sample Statistics
Table 3 presents simple statistics for my sample on the value ratio,
a logarithmic transformation of the value ratio, and the governance
ranking. I use a logarithmic transformation of the value ratio to test
the correlation between governance and firm value for two reasons.
First, the raw value ratio is restricted to the [0, 1] interval, and highly
skewed (most observations are near the lower end of this range). It
does not satisfy the normality assumptions that underlie regression
analysis. Second, the raw value ratio gives very little weight to
differences in value at the low end of the value range. For example,
the 100-fold difference between a value ratio of 0.0001 and 0.01
counts about the same as the 2-fold difference between 0.01 and 0.02.
Table 3: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Standard Number of
Deviation Observations
Value Ratio 0.07 0.121 16
Ln(Value Ratio) -4.09 2.40 16
Governance Ranking 26 14.5 16
III. RESULTS
A. Basic Regression Results
The next step is to determine the correlation between governance
"' See Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, supra note 1, at 1768.
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ranking and ln(value ratio). I test the hypothesis that high
governance ranking (low governance quality) correlates negatively
with In (value ratio).
I run a simple regression (equivalent to computing the Pearson
product-moment correlation coefficient r) of In(value ratio), as the
dependent variable, on governance ranking, as the independent
variable. A constant term is the only other independent variable. The
regression equation and related statistics are shown in Table 4. Figure
1 shows the raw data together with the fitted regression line. The
Pearson correlation coefficient is -0.90, with a correspondingly high Rk
of 0.81. Statistical significance is very high (t = -7.63) despite the small
sample size.
Table 4: Regression: Ln(Value Ratio) on Governance Ranking
In (value ratio) = -0.281 + (-0.148) - (governance ranking)
(t = -7.63) (p < .0001)'
7
F(1, 14) = 58.24
Pearson r= -0.898 (R2 = 0.806; adj. -- 0.792)
17 All significance levels for regression and correlation coefficients reported in this
Article are for two-tail tests.
20011 DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MATTER? 2143
Figure 1: Regression: ln(vaue ratio) on Governance Ranking
(high ranking implies worse governance)
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These results are tentative because of the small sample size. But
they are surprisingly strong, given the crude nature of the governance
rankings and the estimates of potential Western market capitalization,
and the many factors that can affect firm value. In Russia, corporate
governance behavior, as captured by the governance ranking, appears
not only to affect firms' market value, but to be the dominant
determinant of the value ratio.
The results are not only statistically strong, they are economically
powerful. Converting the logarithmic regression to exponential form,
it becomes:
value ratio = 0.755 . ( 0.148) - (gorm..ce anking)
An improvement (reduction) in governance ranking by one standard
deviation-roughly 15 points-predicts an increase in firm value by a
factor of e (.148) (-,4.2) = 8.58. A worst (ranking of 51) to best (ranking
of 7) change in governance predicts an increase in firm value by a
factor of e (-0"") (-4) = 673.
Other (unobserved) factors affect the value ratio as well. The
mean distance of the actual In(value ratio) from the fitted regression
line is 0.82. Thus, the actual value ratio differs from the value ratio
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predicted by the regression line, on average, by a factor of e""2 = 2.3.
The maximum difference between the actual and predicted value
ratio is a factor of 9.8. But the effect on market value of these
unobserved factors, although economically large, pales compared to
the apparent value effect of the governance ranking.
B. Robustness Checks
1. Normality Tests
Least squares regression assumes that the dependent variable and
(less critically) the independent variables are normally distributed.
This assumption is reasonably satisfied by my data. Standard tests for
normality fail to reject the hypothesis of normal distribution for both
ln(value ratio) and governance ranking. Neither ln(value ratio) nor
governance ranking shows significant skewness or kurtosis. For
example, the commonly used Shapiro-Wilk W test for normality
produces insignificant z statistics for both variables: 8
ln(value ratio): W= 0.905 z= 1.31 (p =.10)
governance ranking: W= 0.913 z = 1.13 (p = .13)
2. Alternative Measures of Correlation
I also run two alternative specifications of the correlation
coefficient that are less sensitive to whether the variables are normally
distributed. First, I compute the Spearman rank-order correlation
coefficient rho. The Pearson coefficient r uses information about the
distance of each data point from the mean for each variable. In
contrast, the Spearman coefficient rho uses information only about
the relative ranks of the data points. It is not affected by the
logarithmic transformation of the value ratio and would not be
affected by a similar transformation of the governance ranking. The
results are again strong:
Spearman rho = -0.804 (t = -5.07; p = .0002)
is Similar results (failure to reject the hypothesis of normality) are obtained from
the D'Agostino-Royston test for normality used in the Stata statistics software, which
combines skewness and kurtosis measures into an adjusted x2. The computed values
are X2 = 3.26 (p = .20) for In(value ratio) and X = 2.94 (p = .23) for governance
ranking.
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Second, I compute the Kendall z-b correlation coefficient, which
relies on differences in rank order and is less dependent than either
Pearson or Spearman on the distribution of the variables, again with
strong results:
Kendall's z-b = -0.627
Kendall's score = -74 (standard error = 22.11)
z= 74/(22.11) = 3.35 (p= .001)
3. Subsidiaries ofYukos
Three of the sixteen firms in my sample are publicly traded
subsidiaries of Yukos, an oil holding company. I treat these three
firms as separate because, although they have the same governance
ranking, their value ratios range from 0.0001 (for Samaraneftegaz) to
0.0016 (for Tomskneft). This suggests that investors value them
differently.
There are other possible ways to treat these firms. One alternative
is to treat the three subsidiaries as a single firm, with value ratio equal
to the mean for the three firms. If I do this, the t-statistic for the
regression in Table 4 drops, which is expected because of the smaller
sample size, but remains very strong at t = -5.98. The regression
coefficient changes only slightly, from -0.148 to -0.153.
Table 5: Alternative Treatment of Yukos Subsidiaries
Regression Pearson
coefficient correlation Number of
Treatment (t-value) coefficient observations
Basic analysis: include three -0.148 -0.898 16
subsidiaries as separate firms (t = -7.63)
Alternative: treat
subsidiaries as single firm -0.153 -0.865 14
with value ratio = average for (t = -5.98)
the three subsidiaries
4. Possible Control Variables
A further robustness check involves adding additional control
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variables to the regression. One possibility is industry controls. This
approach is problematic for two reasons. First, given the small sample
size, one can quickly run out of degrees of freedom. Only oil (7
firms) or oil and gas combined (8 firms) have enough firms in the
sample to make an industry control feasible.
A second reason for not using an industry control is that industry
may proxy for governance risk. Commodity export industries,
including oil and gas, are subject to a high degree of transfer pricing
risk. The commodity can be sold to a middleman controlled by the
insiders at a below-market price and then resold at market price.
These transfer pricing schemes are a favorite way for Russian
managers to pocket profits and avoid taxes. Thus, oil and gas
companies may attract bad managers who welcome the opportunity to
steal the company's cash flow.
Other potential control variables have similar problems. For
example, the percentage stake held by the controlling shareholder
affects the controlling shareholder's ability and incentive to self-deal.
Thus, this variable would be a problematic control variable, even if
share ownership data were available. Insider holdings ought instead
to affect a firm's governance risk and indeed are one factor that
enters Brunswick Warburg's governance rankings.
Having said this, rerunning my basic regression with an oil-and-gas
dummy variable is a natural robustness check. Table 6 shows the
results:
Table 6: Regression: In(value ratio) on
Governance Ranking and Oil/Gas Dummy
ln(value ratio) =-0.392 + (-0.123) - (governance ranking) (t = -4.97) (p< .001)
+ (1.057) - (oil/gas dummy) (t= -1.52)
F(2, 13) = 32.96 (R2 = 0.835; adj. R2 = 0.810)
The oil-and-gas dummy variable takes the expected negative
coefficient, but is not statistically significant. The basic result remains.
Governance ranking takes a large negative coefficient and is highly
significant.
C. Which Governance Elements Matter Most?
A final step in analyzing this data set is to assess, within the
constraints set by the small sample size, which risk factors are most
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important in explaining the overall correlation. I crudely divide the
risk factors into:
(1) disclosure risk (each firm's disclosure and transparency
subranking);
(2) self-dealing risk (the sum of each firm's subrankings for dilution
through share issuance, asset stripping and transfer pricing,
dilution through merger or restructuring, and bankruptcy);
and
(3) other risks (the sum of each firm's subrankings for limits on
foreign ownership, management attitude toward shareholders,
and registrar risk).
An initial hypothesis, from prior theoretical work, 9 is that disclosure
risk and self-dealing risk will separately predict In (value ratio). Table
7 shows the regression results. Only self-dealing risk is statistically
significant. Surprisingly, disclosure risk has a negligible coefficient.
Table 7: Regression: In(value ratio) on
Subcategories of Governance Risk
ln (value ratio) = 0.284 + (-0.218) • (self-dealing risk) (t = -5.03) (p < .001)
+ (-0.244) - (other risk) (t =-1.31)
+ (-0.001) • (disclosure risk) (t = -0.01)
F(3, 12) = 22.51 (R 2 = 0.849; adjusted R2 = 0.811)
These results, although tentative because of the small sample,
suggest that disclosure alone is of limited value in an environment
where company insiders can readily loot the value of minority shares,
despite reasonably full disclosure and ample press coverage. The
subsidiaries of Yukos offer an example. They have the lowest value
ratios and the lowest governance rankings in my sample. These firms'
approximate oil and gas reserves are reasonably known. The looting
of Yukos and its subsidiaries by its controlling shareholder, Mikhail
Khodorkovski, was idely reported in both the Russian and Western
press. Khodorkovski proceeded nonetheless.
' Sre szpra note 12.
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IV. FUTURE RESEARCH
In developed countries, firm-level variation in corporate
governance practices has a minor effect on market value. In Russia,
firm-level variation in governance behavior appears to have a huge
effect on market value. It is the dominant source of interfirm
variation in the value ratio of actual market capitalization to potential
Western market capitalization. What is true for Russian firms is likely
true, perhaps to a lesser extent, for firms in other governance-
challenged countries.
This can be seen as good news for firms in these countries. It
suggests that they can greatly improve their own share values, and thus
reduce their cost of equity capital, through a determined effort to
improve their corporate governance practices.
Important extensions of this research are possible, in Russia and
other countries. Within Russia, my sample was restricted to sixteen
firms. Rankings for a larger number of Russian firms, especially
governance rankings from a different source, will provide an
important robustness check .
Second, the Brunswick Warburg governance rankings depend on
subrankings of firms for eight corporate governance elements. An
extension of this work, not practical with this sample because of the
limited degrees of freedom, would be to estimate how each
governance element affects firm value.2 1 This analysis can become
part of an overall assessment of what really matters in corporate
governance. Third, industry control variables, also not practical to use
in this study because of the small sample size, could help to identify'
which industries are at particular risk for corporate governance
abuses.
The methodology used here can also inform the cross-country
comparisons of corporate governance pioneered by La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny.22 An important issue in these studies
20 Preliminary results from an expanded sample of twenty-one firms are consistent
with the results reported here. See Black, supra note t.
21 For a first effort in this direction, see id.
See RAFAEL LA PORTA, FLORENCIO LOPEZ-DE-SILANEs, ANDREI SHLEIFER &
ROBERT VISHNY, INVESTOR PROTECTION AND CORPORATE VALUATION (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W7403, 1999), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract-id=227583 (Social Science Research
Network); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Corporate
Ownership Around the World, 54J. FIN. 471 (1999); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Agency Problems and Dividend Policies Around
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is how to measure the strength of a country's capital markets. The
measures employed include stock market capitalization as a
percentage of gross domestic product, the number of public
companies per million inhabitants, and bid-asked spreads as a
percentage of share price. The value ratio of actual to potential
Western market capitalization, averaged over a country's major
companies, is more difficult to compute than these measures. But it
can provide a more direct measure of corporate governance quality,
that could permit better tests of the importance of particular
corporate governance rules (preemptive rights, cumulative voting, et
cetera).
The evidence reported here on how much corporate governance
behavior matters in Russia also has practical significance for investors
in Russian firms. The huge value differences attributable to
governance behavior (a 600-fold difference in predicted value
between the worst- and best-ranked firms in my sample) suggest that
investors can usefully devote far more attention than they have in the
past to developing improved measures of governance behavior, and
quantifying their expected effect on firm value.
APPENDIX
The table on the next page provides details about the corporate
governance rankings of the sixteen firms in my sample. It lists each
firm's score on the eight risk factors that enter into the overall
governance ranking.
tMe World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei
Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law and Finance; 106J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998); Rafael La
Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants
of External Finance, 52J. FIN. 1131 (1997). I review this and related research on the
relationship between investor protection and the strength of securities markets in
Black, supra note 12.
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